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PROTECTING INDIVIDUALS FROM SEX
DISCRIMINATION: COMPENSATORY RELIEF
UNDER TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1972
AbstracL Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination
by educational institutions that receive federal financial assistance. While federal courts
agree that the purpose of Title IX is to protect individuals from sex discrimination, they
are divided on the issue of whether compensatory damages are an available remedy to
Title IX plaintiffs. This Comment discusses the limitations inherent in the enforcement of
Title IX in the absence of a damages remedy and urges the Supreme Court to hold that
damages are an available remedy.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19721 provides that no
person may be discriminated against on the basis of sex under any
federally-assisted educational program.2 Although Title IX does not
expressly provide for a private cause of action,3 the Supreme Court
held in Cannon v. University of Chicago4 that Title IX implies a private
cause of action.5 Unfortunately, the Court in Cannon did not deter-
mine what types of remedies are available to plaintiffs bringing a law-
suit under Title IX.6 Consequently, the lower courts are split on
whether compensatory damages7 are available to Title IX plaintiffs.'
The following hypothetical illustrates the problem:
During her senior year in high school, Jane is sexually harassed by
her teacher, Mr. Smith. As a result, Jane suffers severe emotional dis-
tress and must see a psychiatrist. Jane brings a Title IX suit against the
1. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681-86 (West 1990).
2. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (West 1990) provides in pertinent part: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ......
3. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1682 (West 1990).
4. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
5. The Court concluded that the "petitioner may maintain her lawsuit, despite the absence of
any express authorization for it in the statute." Id. at 717.
6. See id.
7. Compensatory damages are those damages that, "for a tort should place the injured person
as nearly as possible in the condition he would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred,"
and that "for breach of contract should place the plaintiff in the position he would be in if the
contract had been fulfilled." C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 560
(1935).
8. See Pfeiffer v. School Bd., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that compensatory
damages are available); see also Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Pa. 1986). But see
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that
damages are not available), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991); see also Lieberman v. University
of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
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school, establishing intentional sex discrimination. Her suit comes to
trial one year after she graduates from high school Mr. Smith no
longer works at the school
If Jane brings her suit in a jurisdiction that does not recognize the
availability of compensatory damages, she will be left remediless.
Because she has graduated and Mr. Smith is no longer at the school,
equitable relief in the form of censuring the school or Mr. Smith, or
allowing Jane to switch into another class, would be meaningless to
Jane. Moreover, Jane is left bearing the cost of both her emotional
distress and the monetary damages she incurred as a consequence.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari from. the Eleventh Cir-
cuit decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, in which
the court denied damages to a victim of sexual harassment. 9 The
Court should resolve the debate in the lower courts by reversing
Franklin and permitting plaintiffs who establish intentional sex dis-
crimination in violation of Title IX to bring actions for compensatory
damages. By granting plaintiffs a damages remedy, the Court would
ensure that Title IX effectively protects individuals from sex discrimi-
nation in educational institutions. Such a decision would have impor-
tant implications not only for Title IX enforcement, but also for the
enforcement of two other similarly-worded federal anti-discrimination
statutes, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11
I. TITLE IX
Title IX was enacted in response to growing concern about the
problem of sex discrimination in education. 12 While proponents of the
bill recognized the pervasiveness of sex discrimination in society, they
were particularly concerned with sex discrimination in education. 13
As a result, Title IX was designed to promote two related, but some-
what different objectives. First, Congress wanted to prevent distri-
9. 911 F.2d 617, cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
10. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 200Dd (West 1981), prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color or national origin in any federally-assisted program.
Title VI's administrative enforcement and remedies provisions, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-1 (West
1981), are identical to the Title IX provisions. See infra notes 32-3f and accompanying text.
11. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985), prohibits
discrimination on the basis of handicap in any federally-assisted program. The Act was amended
in 1978 to incorporate the Title VI provisions on remedies, procedures, and rights, and to provide
for attorney's fees. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a (West 1985).
12. See 118 CONG. Rac. 5804-15 (1972).
13. "[B]ecause education provides access to jobs and financial security, discrimination here is
doubly destructive for women." Id. at 5804.
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bution of federal funds to educational institutions engaging in sex
discrimination. 4 Second, it wanted to provide individuals with
protection against such practices.1 " Despite congressional concern
about distributing federal funds to discriminating institutions, Title
IX's clear emphasis was on protecting individuals from sex
discrimination. 6
Congress drafted Title IX in 1972 using the similarly-worded Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196417 as a model. One year later, Con-
gress passed section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,11 which
incorporated virtually identical prohibitory language. Although the
institutions covered and the groups protected by the statutes are differ-
ent, the statutes share the common goal of protecting individuals from
discrimination by federally-funded organizations. Courts interpreting
the three statutes have uniformly concluded that they are to be inter-
preted and applied in the same way.'9
A. Coverage of Title IX
Since the enactment of Title IX in 1972, courts and federal agencies
charged with writing regulations have had the opportunity to interpret
and shape the jurisdictional reach of the statute. For an institution or
program to come under Title IX's reach, it must satisfy three require-
14. Representative Mink stated:
Any college or university which has [a] ... policy which discriminates against women
applicants ... is free to do so under [Title IX] but such institutions should not be asking the
taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination. Millions of women pay
taxes into the Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds should be used for
the support of institutions to which we are denied equal access.
117 CONG. REc. 39,252 (1971).
15. Senator Bayh, sponsor of the Senate bill, emphasized the second objective: "[Title IX] is a
strong and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to provide women with
solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers...." 118 CoNG. REC.
5806-07 (1972).
16. The Supreme Court stated in Cannon that Title IX was not simply a ban on
discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or a prohibition against disbursement of
public funds to institutions engaged in discrimination. Instead, Title IX was drafted with an
"unmistakable focus on the benefited class." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 691
(1979); see also 117 CONG. RErc 30,411 (1971) (one congressman withdrew from consideration
an alternative proposal that was phrased simply as a directive to the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare not to disburse federal funds to institutions discriminating on the basis of
sex).
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 1981).
18. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985).
19. See, eg., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 ("The drafters of Title IX explicitly assumed that it
would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been."); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624, 631 (1984) (applying the Court's earlier interpretation of Title VI to the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
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ments: it must be educational in nature, must receive federal financial
assistance, and must have engaged in discrimination on the basis of
sex.
20
First, to be subject to Title IX's prohibition on sex discrimination,
an institution must be educational. The federal regulations provide
that Title IX coverage extends to "any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance, whether or not such program or
activity is offered or sponsored by an educational istitution."'
Second, an institution must receive federal financial assistance. The
regulations give an expansive reading of the term "federal financial
assistance," citing numerous examples. 22 An institution receiving fed-
eral financial assistance faces Title IX sanctions if any program in the
institution discriminates on the basis of sex, whether or not the offend-
ing program receives federal assistance.2"
Finally, an institution must engage in sex discrimination for Title
IX to apply. Although the statute does not explicitly define sex dis-
crimination, the regulations and courts interpreting the statute have
construed sex discrimination to include a wide range of discriminatory
acts.24 Discriminatory practices commonly litigated under Title IX
include discrimination on the basis of parental or marital status,25 dis-
crimination in athletics,26 discrimination in admissions policies,2 7
employment discrimination, 28 and sexual harassment.29
20. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680.
21. 45 C.F.R. § 86.1 (1990). For instance, Title IX covers the Agricultural Extension
Service, an informal educational program which includes 4-H Clubs, and Veterans'
Administration apprenticeships and on-the-job training programs. NATIONAL ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON WOMEN'S EDUC. PROGRAMS, THE UNENFORCED LAW: TITLE IX ACIrVIY BY
FEDERAL AGENCIES OTHER THAN HEW 2-3 (1978).
22. Federal financial assistance includes student loans, scholarships and grants, money for
construction and repair of buildings, sale or lease of federal property at reduced cost, provision of
the services of federal personnel, and contracts that assist a program. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (1990).
23. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687 (West 1990) (overturning
Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), in which the Supreme Court held that receipt of
federal aid in one program did not result in institution-wide coverage under Title IX).
24. For a comprehensive study of those discriminatory acts prohibited by Title IX, see
NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION: LEGAL RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES (1983).
25. 34 C.F.R. § 106.40 (1990); see, e.g., Pfeiffer v. School Bd., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).
26. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c), .41 (1990); see, eg., O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 645 F.2d 578
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
27. 34 C.F.R. § 106.21(b) (1990); see, eg., Lieberman v. Univer3ity of Chicago, 660 F.2d
1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
28. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
29. Courts have held that sexual harassment constitutes a violation of Title IX, although
there is no explicit reference to sexual harassment in either the statute or the regulations. See
NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER, supra note 24, ch. 4, at 38.
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B. Enforcement and Remedies Under Title IX
A victim of sex discrimination has recourse to two enforcement
mechanisms: administrative enforcement and private suit. Although
Title IX does not explicitly provide for a private cause of action, the
Supreme Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago that Title IX
impliedly provides for a private cause of action. 0 For both enforce-
ment mechanisms, the complaining party must demonstrate that the
offending institution falls within the jurisdictional reach of Title IX:
namely, that it is a federally-funded educational institution that has
engaged in discriminatory behavior.3
L Administrative Enforcement
Title IX provides for the termination of federal funds for institu-
tions that discriminate on the basis of sex. 2 Any person discriminated
against may file a written complaint with the Department of Educa-
tion.33 The agency may terminate funds after it has completed a thor-
ough investigation. 34 However, this remedy is a severe35 one, not to be
imposed lightly.36
2. Private Enforcement
In addition to filing a complaint with an enforcement agency, a Title
IX plaintiff may bring a private cause of action against an offending
educational institution. The Supreme Court in Cannon recognized the
importance of the fund-termination remedy in avoiding the use of fed-
eral funds to support sex discrimination.37 The Court noted, however,
that such a remedy may not provide an appropriate means for protect-
ing individuals from discrimination. 38 After reviewing the purposes of
the statute, its legislative history, and its similarity to Title VI,39 the
30. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
31. Id. at 680; see supra notes 20-29 and accompanying text.
32. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1682 (West 1978) provides for "the termination of or refusal to grant or to
continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an
express finding ... of a failure to comply with [Title IXI."
33. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (1990).
34. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1990).
35. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705.
36. Congress itself has noted the severity of the fund-termination remedy and has described it
as a last resort. See, eag., 110 CoNG. R c. 7067 (1964).
37. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
38. Id at 705.
39. The federal courts have consistently recognized that a private remedy exists under Title
VI. See id. at 706 n.40.
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Court held that Title IX impliedly provides for private actions to vin-
dicate the rights granted individuals by the statute.4
Courts that have permitted recovery of compensatory damages have
imposed two burdens on private plaintiffs. First, plaintiffs must prove
that the discriminatory act was the proximate cause of their alleged
damages.4 Second, plaintiffs must prove that the offending institution
intentionally discriminated.42
C. Availability of Damages
By implying a private cause of action under Title IX, the Supreme
Court opened a new avenue of recourse to victims of sex discrimina-
tion. No longer are victims relegated solely to an often unsuccessful
fund-termination action. They can now bring a private suit in hopes
of redressing wrongs done to them as individuals.
The Supreme Court has noted, however, that the question of
whether a litigant has a cause of action is distinct from the question of
what relief a litigant is entitled to receive.43 Although concluding that
a private right of action is available under Title IX, the Supreme Court
left open the question of what kinds of remedies a Title IX plaintiff
might recover.' The legislative history45 of Title IX provides no gui-
dance for determining what remedies are available. This situation
40. d at 717. The Court noted that there is no inconsistency between the private remedy
and the administrative remedy: "The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ... takes
the unequivocal position that the individual remedy will provide effective assistance to achieving
the statutory purposes. The agency's position is unquestionably correct." Id at 706-08
(footnotes omitted).
41. See Pfeiffer v. School Bd., 917 F.2d 779, 786 (3d Cir. 1990) (stggesting that plaintiff must
allege that she suffered damages "because of" the school's behavior in order to recover any
damages).
42. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984.), the Court held that the
plaintiff could recover for intentional discrimination in the form of back pay under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. Since Darrone, courts
granting damages in Title VI, Title IX, and Rehabilitation Act suits have uniformly limited
damages recovery to those cases in which the plaintiff has proven intentional discrimination.
Se e.g., Craft v. Board of Trustees, 793 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.) (granting of damages under Title VI
requires proof of discriminatory intent), cert denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986); Beehier v. Jeffes, 664
F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (plaintiff's allegations of intentional dtscrimination were sufficient
to support a damage claim under Title IX). Thus, a victim who seeks compensatory damages
under Title IX must apparently prove that the institution intended to discriminate.
43. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979).
44. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717.
45. Commentators have criticized the dearth of legislative history. See, eg., Note, Lieberman
v. University of Chicago: Refusal to Imply a Damages Remedy Under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 1983 WIs. L. REv. 181, 199 (1983) ("Title IX as it stands today imposes a
broad ban on sex discrimination without specific congressional deflnition of what constitutes
discrimination or how it should be remedied in individual cases.").
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gives rise to the difficult question of what judicially implied remedies
may be available to those protected by Title IX.4
Since Cannon, lower courts and the Supreme Court itself have
struggled with the question of what remedies may be implied under
Title IX. It is well settled that victims of intentional discrimination
may get injunctive relief 7 and retroactive relief such as reinstatement
or back pay.4" The Supreme Court, however, has never directly
addressed the issue of whether victims may recover compensatory
damages4 9 under Title IX or the similarly-worded provisions in Title
VI and the Rehabilitation Act, leaving the law in a state of confusion.
L The Supreme Court
The Supreme.Court has resisted deciding definitively whether dam-
ages are an available remedy in Title IX cases. The Court has decided
two noteworthy cases in the last decade, however, that deal with the
issue of available remedies under Title VI50 and the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. 51 In both, the Court stopped short of holding that damages
were recoverable.
46. See Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations. The
Separation of Powers Concerns; 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469, 497 (1980).
47. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); see infra text
accompanying notes 52-60. Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy forbidding a defendant to do
"some act, or to permit his servants or agents to do some act, which he is threatening or
attempting to commit, or restraining him in the continuance thereof, such act being... injurious
to the plaintiff, and not such as can be adequately redressed by an action at law." BLACK'S LAW
DiCTiONARY 401 (abr. 5th ed. 1983).
48. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984); see infra notes 61-63 and
accompanying text. But see infra note 49. Back pay is the amount of accrued wages awarded to
"give the plaintiff the very thing to which he was entitled." Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 894 (1988).
49. Although back pay and compensatory damages are superficially similar, to the extent that
the plaintiff actually recovers money from the offending party, the two are not identical.
Damages are considered compensation for injury suffered. See supra note 7. Back pay is a form
of equitable relief. Se4 eg., Bowen, 487 U.S. at 894. Back pay is not an available remedy for
students and many victims of sexual harassment, who suffer no wage-related consequences of
discrimination. Of course, both faculty and non-faculty employees subject to other forms of sex
discrimination also are protected under Title IX. At least one court has held, however, that back
pay and other equitable relief are not available to any employee who sues under Title IX. Storey
v. Board of Regents, 604 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (Plaintiff, who demanded an
order directing that she be hired as an assistant professor and receive full back pay, "is not
remediless. She is fully capable of pursuing her claim under Title VII .... []n response to
employment discrimination in federally funded education programs or institutions, Title IX
affords no direct remedy to victims."). Therefore, back pay may prove unavailing to all Title IX
victims.
50. Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. 582.
51. Darrona 465 U.S. 624.
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The Court addressed the issue of what damages, if any, were avail-
able to Title VI plaintiffs alleging discriminatory impact in Guardians
Association v. Civil Service Commission.52 Black and Hispanic mem-
bers of the New York City police department challenged the depart-
ment's last-hired, first-fired policy as having a discriminatory effect in
violation of Title VI.53 Plaintiffs demanded retroactive relief in the
form of constructive seniority and the "corresponding monetary and
nonmonetary entitlements that would be derived therefrom.""4
In a convoluted plurality opinion, the Court affirmed the appellate
court's holding that plaintiffs, victims of unintentional discrimination,
were not entitled to any award of retroactive relief.5 Justice White,
writing the plurality opinion, held that plaintiffs alleging unintentional
discrimination are limited to prospective relief alone.56 Nevertheless,
he concluded that in cases of intentional discrimination, "it may be
that the victim... should be entitled to a compensatory award, as well
as to prospective relief in the event the State continues with the
program.' 57
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor suggested that the ret-
roactive equitable relief claimed by the plaintiffs, including back pay,
would have been available had they alleged and proven intentional dis-
crimination. O'Connor noted, however, that she had no occasion to
address whether there is a private cause of action under Title VI for
damages relief.5
8
Justice Marshall wrote a strongly-worded dissent, in which he con-
cluded that any victim of discrimination, intentional or unintentional,
was entitled to compensatory damages as well as to prospective
relief.59 In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun, agreed that retroactive relief, includ-
ing compensatory damages, should be available for any Title VI viola-
tion.' ° Justices Powell and Burger expressed no view on the issue of
availability of compensatory damages. Thus, four Justices unambigu-
ously stated that damages were an available remedy for victims of
52. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
53. Id at 585.
54. Id at 588.
55. Id at 584 (plurality opinion).
56. Id at 595--603.
57. Id at 597. Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White on this point. Id at 612, (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring).
58. Id at 612 n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. "I believe that compensatory relief may be awarded to private Title VI plaintiffs in the
absence of proof of discriminatory animus." Id. at 615 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 635-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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intentional discrimination, while three others, Justices White, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor, implied that damages would probably be avail-
able to such plaintiffs.
Just one year after its decision in Guardians Association, the Court
in Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone6 1 considered whether sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 authorizes a plaintiff who
alleges intentional discrimination to bring an equitable action for back
pay. The Court unanimously held that back pay is an available rem-
edy. The Court relied on Guardians Association in reaching its conclu-
sion: "In [Guardians Association], a majority of the Court expressed
the view that a private plaintiff under Title VI could recover back pay;
and no Member of the Court contended that back pay was unavaila-
ble, at least as a remedy for intentional discrimination."62 Despite its
firm stance on the availability of back pay, the Court again did not
reach the issue of whether compensatory damages are recoverable
under section 504, Title VI, or Title IX.63
2. The Lower Courts
Both before and after these Supreme Court decisions, lower courts
have struggled with the question of whether to imply a damages rem-
edy for victims of intentional discrimination under Title IX. The
courts are split on the issue."4 Two 1990 appellate decisions highlight
the debate.
The Third Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether a Title IX
plaintiff may recover compensatory damages. In Pfeiffer v. School
Board,65 the court concluded that compensatory damages are an avail-
able remedy under Title IX. Pfeiffer was a member of her school's
chapter of the National Honor Society.6 6 During her junior year,
Pfeiffer, who was unmarried, discovered that she was pregnant. The
faculty council of the National Honor Society, upon learning of her
pregnancy, unanimously voted to dismiss Pfeiffer from the Society.
67
Pfeiffer filed suit against the School District alleging sex discrimina-
tion in violation of Title IX, seeking both injunctive relief and compen-
satory damages.
61. 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (Darrone filed suit against Consolidated Rail Corporation, alleging
that Consolidated had violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by refusing to employ him
after an accident required amputation of one arm).
62. Id. at 630-31 (footnotes omitted).
63. See id at 630.
64. See supra note 8.
65. 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).
66. Id. at 781-82.
67. IML at 782.
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In reversing the lower court's denial of Pfeiffer's claim, the Third
Circuit addressed whether compensatory damages would be available
to Pfeiffer in the event she established liability. The court stated, "[A]
majority of the Court [in Guardians Association] found that compensa-
tory relief.., is available for Title VI violations when intentional dis-
crimination is present"68 and concluded that "compensatory relief is
available for certain Title IX violations and that this is one of them.
69
The court stopped short of defining what types of dmnages the plaintiff
might be entitled to if she prevailed in her suit. Other courts have
similarly held that damages are available under Title IX,70 Title VI,71
and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,72 again with virtually no
mention of what specific types of compensatory damages might be
available.
In sharp contrast to Pfeiffer, the Eleventh Circuit in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools7" held that Title DI does not contem-
plate a damages remedy. Franklin, a former high school student,
brought a private Title IX action against Gwinnett County Public
Schools and the school's principal, seeking damages for alleged sexual
harassment by her economics teacher and coach.74 The district court
dismissed her action for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted.7" The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's
dismissal, holding that Franklin was not entitled to damages.76
Like the court in Pfeiffer, the Eleventh Circuit based its holding on
the Guardians Association decision. Unlike the Third Circuit, how-
ever, the court held that Guardians Association was inconclusive
regarding the issue of the availability of damages. The court con-
cluded that the Supreme Court simply left open the question of
whether damages were an available remedy, thus freeing lower courts
68. Id at 788.
69. Id
70. See, eg, Beehler v. Jeffes, 664 F. Supp. 931, 940 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
71. See, eg, Craft v. Board of Trustees, 793 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 829
(1986); Cortes v. Board of Governors, 766 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. IM. 1991); Paisey v. Vitale, 634 F.
Supp. 741 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd on other grounds, 807 F.2d 889 (11th Cir. 1986); Singh v.
Superintending School Comm., 601 F. Supp. 865 (D. Me. 1985).
72. See, eg., Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 769 F.2d 532 (9th Ch.), rev'd on other grounds,
474 U.S. 936 (1985); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 909, and
cert denied sub nom. Special School Dist. v. Miener, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); Fitzgerald v. Green
Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (holding that Fitzgerald was
entitled to damages for emotional anguish and loss of earnings).
73. 911 F.2d 617 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
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to create or withhold an implied damages remedy, checked only by
precedent within their jurisdictions. 7 The Eleventh Circuit felt bound
by an earlier decision 78 denying a damages remedy to a Title VI plain-
tiff.7 9 The Eleventh Circuit does not stand alone in reaching this con-
clusion; many courts have held that Title IX,8o Title VI,8 1 and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act" preclude a damages remedy.
IL COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ARE NECESSARY
Title IX was intended to achieve two purposes: first, to avoid the use
of federal funds to support discriminatory practices; and second, to
provide individuals with effective protection against those practices.83
Despite this two-fold purpose, Title IX's unambiguous focus is on the
victims' rights.8 4 The fund-termination remedy85 is particularly well-
suited to preventing the use of federal funds to support sex discrimina-
tion; it is less effective in protecting the victims themselves. Private
suits are necessary to effectuate Title IX's goal of protecting individu-
als.86 Private suits, however, can effectively protect individuals against
discriminatory practices only when the relief granted both compen-
sates the victim and deters the defendant from future discriminatory
acts. Unlike presently available remedies, such as declaratory or
injunctive relief, which all-too often are completely unavailing, a dam-
ages remedy would provide the compensatory and deterrent effects
necessary to further the policies underlying Title IX.
A. Title IX Without a Damages Remedy Fails to Meet Its Essential
Purpose
The absence of a damages remedy limits Title IX's ability to effec-
tively protect individuals from sex discrimination. The fund-termina-
77. Id. at 621.
78. Drayden v. Needville Indep. School Dist., 642 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1981).
79. "Because we conclude... that the Supreme Court has not overruled Drayden either
explicitly or implicitly, we are bound to follow Drayden's mandate that damages are unavailable
under Title VI and IX." Franklin, 911 F.2d at 622.
80. See, eg., Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cert denied,
456 U.S. 937 (1982); Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd on
other grounds, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989).
81. See, eg., Drayden, 642 F.2d at 133; Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Indian Trails
Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. I1. 1980).
82. See, eg., Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. Tex. 1982);
Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Cal. i979).
83. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
86. Note, supra note 45, at 207.
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tion remedy offers little, if any, protection to individuals who have
been victims of sex discrimination. A private cause of action without a
damages remedy is little better and fails in three respects: first, victims
of sex discrimination may hesitate to take their cases to trial; second,
even if they do proceed to trial, they may be left with no effective
remedy, and courts may dismiss the suits; and third, even in those
cases where equitable relief is sought and awarded, its compensatory
and deterrent effects may be minimal.
While administrative fund-termination may serve Title IX's goal of
avoiding using federal funds to support discrimination,87 it is not effec-
tive in protecting victims of sex discrimination. Victims are primarily
interested in compensation for the harm done to -them, not in ftmd-
termination.88 Because termination of federal aid to an offending insti-
tution does not provide victims of sex discrimination with the compen-
sation they desire, the fund-termination remedy offers little
consolation to discrimination victims. Indeed, the fund-termination
remedy, if applied, might actually prove detrimental to the very people
Title IX is designed to protect: if an educational program's funds are
terminated, future participants in the program will be denied the bene-
fits of much-needed federal financial assistance. 89
A private cause of action without a damages :remedy is scarcely
more effective in protecting individuals. First, Title IX fails to curtail
sex discrimination because, in the absence of a damages remedy, valid
claims of sex discrimination may go unheard. Victims may not bring
valid claims because, without a damages remedy, there is little incen-
tive to litigate. Litigation is costly90 and time-consuming. At trial,
plaintiffs may be forced to air their dirty laundry and to relive embar-
rassing or painful moments. Often, plaintiffs' sole motivation for
enduring a trial is the knowledge that they may te compensated for
87. The effectiveness of the fund-termination remedy depends on whether it is actually
employed. Because it is such a blunt instrument-resulting in termination of enormous amounts
of federal funds-it is rarely used. In cases involving individual incidents of discrimination, the
possibility that funds would be terminated is remote. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 705 (1979) (a complete cutoff of funding is appropriate only when the institution's
practices are "pervasively discriminatory").
88. See idL
89. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 627 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
90. In 1976, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 1981), which provides, in part, that a court may, in its discretion, allow
the prevailing plaintiff in a Title IX action reasonable attorney's fees. While recovery of
attorney's fees may spare the plaintiff monetary expense, it does not alleviate the plaintiff's
expenses of time and emotional energy. Moreover, it does nothing to recompense the plaintiff for
the injuries sustained as a result of the discrimination.
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the harms they have suffered. Denying plaintiffs compensatory dam-
ages diminishes their incentive to litigate.91
Second, the lack of a damages remedy undermines Title IX's effec-
tiveness because valid private claims are frequently dismissed. If the
only available remedy is injunctive relief, and the circumstances have
rendered injunctive relief moot, a court will have no choice but to dis-
miss the suit because there is no relief available to the plaintiff. For
instance, a highly-qualified student who has been denied admission to
an educational institution on the basis of sex is likely to enter another
institution before the suit comes to trial. If the student is already
attending another school, a suit for declaratory relief demanding that
the defendant school admit the student will be moot.92 Similarly, a
student who has been victimized by sexual harassment will be remedi-
less, absent a damages remedy, if the student has graduated from the
school or the harasser is no longer affiliated with the school. 93 This
serves to diminish both the compensatory and the deterrent purposes
of Title IX; plaintiffs will be left remediless, and educational programs
and institutions will go uncensured for their intentional discriminatory
practices.
Finally, even in those cases in which equitable relief is sought and
awarded, the deterrent and compensatory effects will be minimal, thus
weakening Title IX's impact. Equitable relief in the form of reinstate-
ment, admission into a program, or back pay, requires only that the
offending institution do what it would have done if it had not engaged
in the discriminatory behavior.94 Often-particularly when there are
91. See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, CIVIL RIGHTS Aar OF 1990, H.R. REP. No.
644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 39 (1990) ("One can expect that a potential claimant will
pause long before enduring the humiliation of making public the indignities which she has
suffered in private... when she is precluded from recovering damages for her perpetrators'
behavior." (quoting Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc. 629 F. Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986))); see also
Comment, Protections Against HIV-Based Employment Discrimination in the United States and
Australia, 13 HASTiNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 609, 632 (1990) (illustrating the lack of
incentive to litigate when the Rehabilitation Act does not provide for recovery of compensatory
damages).
92. See Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1981)
(Swygert, J., dissenting), cert denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
93. See, eg., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 911 F.2d 617, 622 (1lth Cir. 1990)
(because plaintiff was remediless, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal for failure to state
a claim for which relief could be granted), cert granted, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991); Alexander v.
Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (because students' graduation prevented the court from
redressing their injuries, dismissal of their suits was proper).
94. In Guardians Association, for example, plaintiffs, who had been fired under a last-hired,
first-fired policy, demanded constructive seniority and back pay and back medical insurance
benefits that they would have received had they been appointed on their constructive seniority
dates. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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no wage-related consequences of such discrimination-such relief
involves little, if any, real expense to the defendant.95 When faced
with so minor, and so relatively inexpensive, a penalty, the institution
may have little incentive to avoid engaging in discriminatory behavior
in the future.
An even more significant failure of equitable relief is its failure to
compensate the victims of sex discrimination for the losses that they
have sustained as a result of the discrimination. At best, injunctive
relief only nominally compensates members of the protected class by
giving them what they were originally deprived of by the discriminat-
ing institution. However, an injunction will generally be inadequate
consolation for sex discrimination victims who have suffered embar-
rassment, mental anguish, and pecuniary loss as a ,onsequence of the
discrimination.
B. A Compensatory Damages Remedy Effectively Promotes the
Policies and Purposes Behind Title IX
Title IX's purpose of protecting individuals from sex discrimination
will be better served if compensatory damages are made available to
those victims who have suffered the consequences of intentional dis-
crimination. The availability of damages will encourage victims to
pursue valid discrimination claims, encourage offending institutions to
think twice before engaging in sex discrimination in the future, and
deter other institutions from engaging in discriminatory behavior.
Most importantly, a damages remedy will provide adequate compen-
sation to sex discrimination victims for their injuries. Thus, where a
private cause of action without damages fails, a suit in which the plain-
tiff may recover compensatory damages succeeds in effectuating the
policies underlying Title IX.
The deterrent effect of a damages remedy will directly further Title
IX's purpose of protecting individuals from sex discrimination. Faced
with the possibility of incurring damages for sex discrimination, edu-
cational institutions will be more inclined to discotuage discriminatory
behavior in their programs. Successful suits, in which the plaintiff
recovers damages, will certainly deter the defendant. As a result of
95. See, e-g., Pfeiffer v. School Bd., 917 F.2d 779, 783 (3d Cir. 1990). Plaintiff sought an
injunction that she be reinstated in the local chapter of the National Hlonor Society (NHS) from
which she had been dismissed, "that the records of the school district be corrected to show that
she remains in good standing in the society, that a procedure for dismissal be ordered that is not
discriminatory, [and] that the NHS be prohibited from disseminating information about her
dismissal." Id. In Title IX cases brought by students, the defendant will be faced with similar
requirements-the more costly back pay remedy will not come into play.
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such suits, the defendant will have to divert funds to a prevailing
plaintiff that would otherwise go to educational programs, increased
salaries, and improved facilities. In addition, successful suits may also
deter other institutions, which can learn, at a lesser price, from the
defendant's mistakes. Indeed, it may not take more than a handful of
suits where the defendant is required to pay significant damages to a
plaintiff before institutions understand that sex discrimination is a
costly mistake.
The most significant effect of a damages remedy is that it would
compensate plaintiffs who have been victimized by the discriminatory
practices of an educational institution. The Supreme Court recog-
nized in Cannon that Congress, through the express language of Title
IX, confers a federal right on individuals.96 That right is to be free
from sex discrimination at the hands of educational institutions.
Because of the limitations inherent in currently available remedies, a
monetary damages award is the only remedy that can directly com-
pensate a victim for injuries sustained as a result of the infringement of
that right. As students are frequently the plaintiffs in Title IX actions,
there are often no wage-related consequences of sex discrimination.
Even when there is a wage-related consequence of sex discrimination,
back pay may not be an available remedy.97 The lack of a compensa-
tory damages remedy thus denies victims of sex discrimination any
monetary relief under Title IX. In situations where back pay is not
recoverable, compensatory damages become even more important as a
means of recompensing victims.98
L Damages that Should Be Recoverable Under Title IX
The question of what kinds of damages a Title IX plaintiff is entitled
to recover is best answered by examining the remedies available for
breach of contract and torts cases. The damages available in such
cases-expectation, reliance, restitution, and consequential damages,
as well as non-economic damages-should all be equally available to
sex discrimination victims suing under Title IX.
Many of the damages that sex discrimination victims suffer are
analogous to those that a plaintiff suing for breach of contract might
suffer. Expectation damages, or the value that one would have
received in the absence of breach, should be recoverable. For example,
96. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979); see Note, supra note 45, at
208.
97. See supra note 49.
98. See Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongv Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay
Remedy, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 1301, 1366 (1990).
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a well-qualified student denied admission to a prestigious medical
school might be forced to attend a second choice, less well-known
school. As a consequence, the student's earning capacity might be
diminished. An award of the value of the expectancy that acceptance
into the prestigious school created would put the student in as good a
position as he or she would have occupied had the defendant per-
formed its Title IX obligations.99
A victim who spends money in reliance on an educational institu-
tion's obligation not to discriminate may also have a claim for reliance
damages, or those losses incurred by the student other than fees the
student paid directly to the defendant. A female high school student
who expects to play on the school's ice hockey team may invest in
equipment and a uniform. If she is denied the right to play on the
team, in violation of Title IX, she should certainly be entitled to
recover the value of the equipment and uniform.'")
A third contract-type remedy that should be available to Title IX
plaintiffs is restitution damages, or the value that the victim has con-
ferred upon the offending party. For instance, a student may pay an
initiation fee or annual dues to become a member of a school organiza-
tion. If the student is dismissed from that organization on the basis of
the student's sex, without having enjoyed membership benefits, the
organization should be required to return the fee to the student.
Fourth, victims of sex discrimination may incur consequential dam-
ages, those damages that naturally result from defendant's discrimina-
tory conduct. For example, a student who is deried admission to a
school may incur moving expenses if forced to relocate to another city
to attend a different school. Under a breach of contract analysis, such
consequential damages would have to be reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant at the time of the discriminatory act in order to be recover-
able.101 Therefore, if moving expenses are a reasonably foreseeable
99. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52,
54 (1936). Of course, Title IX plaintiffs will run into great difficulties in proving both proximate
cause and an accurate measure of damages. Only in those rare circumstances in which plaintiffs
can prove both these elements should they prevail on an expectation theory and recover damages.
Where plaintiffs fail to prove that a defendant's discrimination resulted in actual monetary
damages, plaintiffs are properly relegated to equitable relief alone.
100. In a situation such as this, injunctive relief-the right to play on the hockey team-
would of course be a more satisfying remedy for the plaintiff. However, where injunctive relief is
not available (for instance, because the plaintiff has already graduated from high school),
damages should be recoverable.
101. See C. McComicK, supra note 7, at 562. This requirement may impose significant
limitations on a victim's right to recover consequential damages, as the victim will have to prove
that the losses are of a type usually resulting from the defendant's discriminatory act or that the
defendant had some other reason to know that these damages were possible. Id. at 565.
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consequence of a school's denial of admission to a well-qualified appli-
cant, the school should be held responsible for the student's costs of
relocating.
Victims of intentional sex discrimination should also be compen-
sated for their non-economic losses. Such individuals often suffer
potentially great non-economic damages, such as mental anguish,
emotional distress, and humiliation.1 "2 This emotional anguish may
manifest itself in emotional disorders and medical problems, which
may in turn cause victims to suffer substantial out-of-pocket medical
expenses.10 3 These damages are commonly available in intentional
tort actions in order to place injured plaintiffs in the condition they
would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred 4 and should be
made equally available to victims of sex discrimination. 10 5
While in some cases these losses may be relatively minor," in
others they can amount to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 107 The
question becomes, "Who should bear the.., costs of intentional, ille-
gal discrimination: the perpetrator of the discrimination or the vic-
tim?" 10 In the absence of a compensatory damages remedy, it is often
the victim of sex discrimination who bears the burden. If Title IX
permits no recovery of compensatory damages, discrimination victims
cannot be made whole for the losses they have sustained. Instead,
102. See, ag., Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa
1984) (court awarded plaintiff $1000 for his emotional anguish after being denied a job on the
basis of his handicap).
103. See HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, CIVIL RIGmis Acr OF 1990, H.R. REP. No.
644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 38 (1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1990 was designed to
amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1981), to include a
provision for damages recovery. The current Title VII permits equitable relief, but does not
provide for awards of compensatory or punitive damages. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR,
supra, at 38-39. Although this description of victims' damages was made in the context of
employment discrimination under Title VII, it seems equally applicable to cases of Title IX sex
discrimination in educational programs and institutions.
104. See supra note 7.
105. This kind of non-economic loss is particularly likely to occur where a plaintiff has been
sexually harassed. See, ag., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1119
(N.D. Ill. 1987) (employee brought a Title VII lawsuit against her employer after suffering
anxiety, physical illness and depression as the result of sexual harassment on the job), aff'd in
relevant part, 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989).
106. See supra note 102.
107. See, ag., Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1186, 1188 n.8 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982). The plaintiff had been denied admission to the
University of Chicago and consequently moved to Cambridge, Massachusetts to attend Harvard
Medical School. Her husband continued to reside in Chicago while she went to Harvard. The
plaintiff sought compensatory damages for her moving expenses, pain and suffering and loss of
consortium, amounting to $350,000.
108. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, supra note 103, at 39 (1990) (quoting Ellen
Vargyas, Esq. of the National Women's Law Center).
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they are left bearing the brunt of involuntarily incurred expenses-
expenses they may not be able to afford. 1°9
Title IX should afford victims the full panoply of compensatory
damages. These damages should include expectation, reliance, and
restitution damages, as well as monetary relief for humiliation, pain
and suffering, other psychological and physical harm, medical
expenses incurred, and other economic losses and cut-of-pocket costs.
Only when Title IX permits the recovery of these damages will it be
able to fully protect individuals from sex discrimination.
2. Financial Impact of Implying a Damages Remedy
Fashioning a damages remedy always creates concerns about open-
ing the flood gates of litigation and the effect that a new remedy will
have on the court system and on potential defendants. Creating a
damages remedy under Title IX would pose little danger of dramati-
cally increased litigation. In Cannon, the Supreme Court was unper-
suaded by arguments that implying a private remedy would result in
an explosion of expensive and time-consuming lawsuits.1 10 In order to
recover damages under Title IX, plaintiffs may not merely prove that
they were victims of discriminatory impact; instead, they have the
challenging task of proving that they are the victims of intentional
discrimination in order to recover any compensatory damages.11 In
addition, victims must demonstrate that they have suffered quantifi-
able damages that resulted from the discrimination.112 As a result,
establishing a damages remedy is unlikely to create a race to the court-
house by sex discrimination victims.
Of even greater concern to educational programs and institutions,
and to some courts, is the financial impact of a damages award on
individual defendants.113 Such concern is misplaced. Where a recipi-
109. See eg., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 44 Fair Empl. Prac. Czs. (BNA) 1119 (N.D. I11.
1987). In this Title VII case, the plaintiff had suffered months of sexual harassment by her
supervisor. The court concluded that this harassment caused her anxiety, physical illness, and "a
severe and debilitating depression" which required psychiatric treatment and made her unable to
work. IdL at 1122. However, because Title VII does not provide for damages recovery, the court
was unable to hold her employer liable for her expenses.
110. "[R]espondents have not come forward with any demonstration that Title VI litigation
has been so costly or voluminous that either the academic community or the courts have been
unduly burdened." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
111. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
112. See C. McCoMsICK, supra note 7, at 565-66; supra note 41 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1981)
("[Tihe implication of a damages remedy would impose a potentially massive financial liability
upon the institutions whose 'acute financial distress' triggered the legislation. Theoretically, this
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ent's federal assistance is significant,"' even a fairly substantial dam-
ages award could have a much less severe effect on the institution's
financial status than the express statutory remedy of fund-termina-
tion.115 Those educational institutions that receive large amounts of
federal financial assistance are unlikely to be financially ruined by the
imposition of a damages remedy. The imposition of a damages rem-
edy may seem harsh, however, when an institution receives only an
insignificant amount of federal assistance. Institutions in this situation
may of course elect to refuse federal financial assistance in order to
avoid future Title IX coverage. In the event that such an institution
has engaged in discriminatory practices and is forced to pay a large
damages award, it will suffer a relatively greater burden. Neverthe-
less, the compelling nature of the Title IX non-discrimination mandate
demands effective remedies. Victims of sex discrimination should not
be denied the right to be compensated for their losses merely because a
damages award exacts a stiff economic toll on an institution that has
engaged in intentional discrimination.
3. Granting a Damages Remedy: Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools," 6 an Eleventh Circuit decision that denied
damages to a student victim of sexual harassment suing under Title
IX. The Supreme Court should reverse Franklin and hold that dam-
ages are an available remedy for those victims who allege and establish
intentional sex discrimination. Such a holding would be amply sup-
ported by Title IX's legislative history and text, and the policies
underlying the statute. In the event that the Supreme Court holds to
the contrary, Congress should act swiftly to overturn the Court's deci-
sion in order to ensure that Title IX provides adequate protection to
liability could exceed the amount of the federal funds received."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937
(1982).
114. Federal financial assistance often runs into the hundreds of millions of dollars. In 1989,
Johns Hopkins University received $612,128,000 in federal financial aid, excluding federal
support to students in the form of guaranteed student loans. Total financial aid to United States
colleges and universities exceeds fifteen billion dollars. National Science Foundation, Fact File:
US. Funds for Colleges & Universitie; Vol. XXXVII, No. 30 CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDuc. 24
(1991).
115. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 629 (1984) (noting that "the
government's decision to terminate federal funds... has more drastic consequences for the
funded programs than do private suits for individual relief" (citing LeStrange v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1982) (Weis, J., concurring))).
116. 911 F.2d 617 (llth Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
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the many victims of intentional sex discrimination in America's educa-
tional institutions. 117
III. CONCLUSION
Congress' dual aim in enacting Title IX was to prevent the use of
federal funds to subsidize sex discrimination in education and to pro-
vide protection to individual citizens against such discrimination.
Despite this two-fold purpose, Title IX's unambiguous focus is on pro-
tecting individuals.
The lack of a damages remedy renders Title D.I incapable of ade-
quately redressing sex discrimination in education. In the absence of a
damages remedy, victims may forego valid prosecutions of their
claims, and valid claims that are brought may be dismissed because no
relief can be granted. Even if some kind of injunctive relief is awarded,
the deterrent and compensatory effects of such relief are often
negligible.
The federal circuit courts are divided on the issue of whether com-
pensatory damages may be recovered for a violation of Title IX. The
Supreme Court should resolve this debate among the lower courts by
holding that damages are recoverable to those plaintiffs who establish
intentional sex discrimination. By fashioning a damages remedy, the
Court would ensure that educational institutions would be deterred
from engaging in future discriminatory behavior and would allow vic-
tims of sex discrimination to be adequately compensated for their
involuntarily-incurred losses. Congress' goal of protecting individuals
from sex discrimination in education can be realized only if damages
are made available.
Pamela W. Kernie
117. Congress has not hesitated to overturn Supreme Court decisions that it finds to be
incorrect interpretations of civil rights laws. See supra note 23.
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